Chance in Kubrick: plans, accidents and unforeseen outcomes

A plan can fail because of something unforeseen and still have accumulated vulnerabilities before the accident. Kubrick’s films allow us to distinguish contingency, calculation and choice rather than attributing everything to bad luck.

A plan organises actions; it doesn’t control everything around them

The Killing presents a project that depends on coordination, schedules and the allocation of roles. Each participant knows one part and must act in relation to other actions they cannot always observe. The precision of the organisation creates an expectation of control. At the same time, this dependence multiplies the points where a local variation can affect the whole.

The interest lies not only in discovering whether the plan succeeds. The narrative allows us to recognise how an apparently secondary decision connects with another. A procedure can be detailed and still depend on other people’s behaviour, information shared unevenly or materials that don’t withstand what is expected of them. Planning reduces certain uncertainties, but it doesn’t turn the environment into an extension of the will of the person in charge.

The incident involving the suitcase and the small dog near the baggage transfer concentrates this relationship. Contingency acts on an object and a situation that are already prepared. It isn’t enough to say that chance destroys a perfect plan: we must ask what made it possible for an incident to have that reach. The vulnerability lies in the connection between an unforeseen event and prior conditions.

The ending of The Killing examines the sequence as a whole. From the perspective of chance, it is enough to distinguish the immediate cause from the preparation. The fact that nobody intended a particular outcome doesn’t mean there is no causal chain. An accident may be unintentional and yet reveal material limits and decisions that had concentrated too much risk in one place.

The rules of a duel don’t eliminate unequal access to information

Barry Lyndon uses duels that appear to subject the participants to shared rules. That appearance doesn’t guarantee that everyone knows the same things or faces identical consequences. An encounter can be presented as a test of courage when others control part of its organisation. A character’s uncertainty may be the result of a prepared situation, not neutral chance.

The duels in Barry Lyndon allow us to distinguish these variations. At some moments, what matters is who knows the procedure; at others, it’s what a participant chooses to do within it. The rule establishes a framework, but it doesn’t automatically determine every act. Reducing the outcome to luck would make the deliberate gestures that alter a power relationship disappear.

Choosing not to take an opportunity, for example, isn’t in the same category as an involuntary mistake. It can change the risk and the interpretation of the encounter. Analysis must follow the specific action before assigning it a general meaning of fate. A decision can have consequences that the person making it doesn’t fully control, without ceasing to be a decision.

The question of freedom and responsibility arises in the space between intention and outcome. Not every consequence faithfully expresses what someone wanted, and not every lack of control removes their causal involvement. The character acts within inherited conditions, but their responses can change who is exposed, what opportunity opens up and what obligation is accepted.

Risk isn’t distributed equally

Money changes one’s capacity to withstand contingency. A loss can be a setback for one person and a definitive interruption for another. The relationship between money and debt allows us to see what room for manoeuvre remains after a failure. In principle, chance can affect everyone, but its consequences are experienced from different material positions.

Social class introduces another difference. Barry can temporarily gain access to certain spaces without having the sense of belonging that would protect him when his circumstances change. A failed action doesn’t land on an empty biography: it encounters relationships, reputations and resources that are already unequally distributed. That’s why interpreting his journey only as bad luck would obscure the social mechanisms the film makes visible.

Institutions also classify outcomes after they happen. They may call something an error that they had previously accepted as a risk, or assign individual responsibility to protect a collective decision. The interpretation of institutional power allows us to compare this process with personal plans. The name given to a failure may benefit whoever controls the narrative, even if it doesn’t fully explain how it happened.

Narrative form influences how we perceive chance. Knowing an outcome in advance can make every detail seem to lead inevitably towards it. Seeing an action without knowing its consequences keeps more possibilities open. The sense of fatality may be an effect of the narrative, not proof that nobody within the film’s world could have acted differently.

Comparing these situations requires us to ask different questions: what was unforeseeable, what could have been anticipated and what was chosen despite knowing the risk. The Killing and Barry Lyndon don’t offer a single theory of luck. They make perceptible the distance between a plan and its execution, and between a rule and the people who use it. That distance preserves both contingency and responsibility, without needing one to erase the other.

References: Stanley Kubrick, The Killing (1956) and Barry Lyndon (1975). A comparative reading of planning, accident and duelling; references to the ending are limited to the mechanism analysed and don’t imply that the director held a doctrine of fatalism.

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