Chance in Kubrick: plans, accidents and unexpected outcomes

A plan can fail because of something unforeseen and still have accumulated vulnerabilities before the accident. Kubrick’s films allow us to distinguish contingency, calculation and choice rather than attributing everything to bad luck.

A plan organises actions; it does not control everything around them

The Killing presents a scheme that depends on coordination, timings and the division of roles. Each participant knows one part and must act in relation to other actions they cannot always observe. The precision of the organisation creates an expectation of control. At the same time, that dependence multiplies the points at which a local variation can affect the whole.

The interest lies not only in discovering whether the plan succeeds. The narrative lets us see how an apparently secondary decision connects with another. A procedure can be detailed and still depend on other people’s behaviour, unequally shared information or materials that do not withstand what is expected of them. Planning reduces certain uncertainties, but it does not turn the environment into an extension of the will of the person in charge.

The episode involving the suitcase and the small dog near the luggage transfer brings this relationship into focus. Contingency acts on an object and a situation that are already in place. It is not enough to say that chance destroys a perfect plan: we must ask what made it possible for an incident to have such an impact. The vulnerability lies in the connection between an unforeseen event and the conditions already in place.

The ending of The Killing examines the entire sequence. From the perspective of chance, it is enough to distinguish the immediate cause from the preparation. The fact that nobody intended a particular outcome does not mean there is no chain of cause and effect. An accident may be unintentional and yet reveal material limits and decisions that had concentrated too much risk in one place.

The rules of a duel do not eliminate unequal information

Barry Lyndon uses duels that seem to subject the participants to shared rules. This appearance does not guarantee that everyone knows the same things or faces identical consequences. An encounter can be presented as a test of courage when some of its arrangements are controlled by others. A character’s uncertainty may result from a contrived situation, not from neutral chance.

The duels in Barry Lyndon allow us to distinguish these variations. At some moments, what matters is who knows the procedure; at others, what a participant decides to do within it. The rule establishes a framework, but does not automatically determine every action. Reducing the outcome to luck would make the deliberate gestures that alter a power relationship disappear.

Choosing not to take an opportunity, for example, is not in the same category as an involuntary failure. It can change the risk and the interpretation of the encounter. Analysis must follow the specific action before assigning it a general meaning of fate. A decision can have consequences that the person making it cannot fully control, without ceasing to be a decision.

The question of freedom and responsibility arises in that space between intention and outcome. Not every consequence faithfully expresses what someone wanted, and a lack of control does not always remove their causal involvement. The character acts within inherited conditions, but their responses can change who is exposed, what opportunity opens up and what obligation is accepted.

Risk is not distributed equally

Money changes a person’s ability to withstand contingency. A loss may be a setback for one person and a definitive interruption for another. The relationship between money and debt allows us to see what room for manoeuvre remains after a failure. In principle, chance can affect everyone, but its consequences are experienced from different material positions.

Social class introduces another difference. Barry can temporarily gain access to certain spaces without having the belonging that would protect him when his circumstances change. A failed action does not fall upon an empty biography: it encounters relationships, reputations and resources that are already unequally distributed. That is why interpreting his journey solely as bad luck would conceal the social mechanisms the film makes visible.

Institutions, too, classify outcomes after they occur. They may call something an error that they had previously accepted as a risk, or assign individual responsibility to protect a collective decision. The interpretation of institutional power allows us to compare this process with personal plans. The name given to failure may benefit whoever controls the narrative, even if it does not fully explain how it came about.

Narrative form influences our perception of chance. Knowing an outcome in advance can make every detail seem to lead inevitably towards it. Watching an action without knowing its consequences keeps more possibilities open. The sense of fatality may be an effect of the narrative, not proof that nobody within the world of the film could have acted differently.

Comparing these situations requires us to ask different questions: what was unforeseeable, what could have been foreseen, and what was chosen despite awareness of a risk. The Killing and Barry Lyndon do not offer a single theory of luck. They make perceptible the distance between a plan and its execution, and between a rule and the people who use it. That distance preserves both contingency and responsibility, without needing one to erase the other.

References: Stanley Kubrick, The Killing (1956) and Barry Lyndon (1975). A comparative reading of planning, accident and duelling; references to the ending are limited to the mechanism under discussion and do not presuppose that the director held a doctrine of fatalism.

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