A plan can fail because of something unforeseen and still have accumulated vulnerabilities before the accident. Kubrick’s films let us distinguish contingency, calculation and choice instead of attributing everything to bad luck.
A plan organizes actions; it doesn’t control everything around them
The Killing presents a project that depends on coordination, schedules and the division of roles. Each participant knows one part and must act in relation to other actions they cannot always observe. The organization’s precision creates an expectation of control. At the same time, this dependence multiplies the points where a local variation can affect the whole.
The interest lies not only in discovering whether the plan succeeds. The narrative lets us see how one seemingly secondary decision comes into contact with another. A procedure can be detailed and still depend on other people’s behaviour, information shared unevenly or materials that do not withstand what is expected of them. Planning reduces certain uncertainties, but it does not turn the environment into an extension of the will of the person in charge.
The episode with the suitcase and the small dog near the baggage transfer brings this relationship into focus. Contingency acts on an object and a situation that are already prepared. It is not enough to say that chance destroys a perfect plan: we must ask what made it possible for an incident to have that impact. The vulnerability lies in the connection between an unforeseen event and pre-existing conditions.
The ending of The Killing examines the full sequence. From the perspective of chance, it is enough to distinguish the immediate cause from the preparations. That nobody intended a certain outcome does not mean there is no causal chain. An accident may be unintentional and yet reveal material limits and decisions that had concentrated too much risk in a single place.
The rules of a duel do not eliminate unequal information
Barry Lyndon uses duels that appear to subject the participants to shared rules. This appearance does not guarantee that everyone knows the same things or faces identical consequences. An encounter may be presented as a test of courage when part of its organization is controlled by others. A character’s uncertainty may result from a prepared situation, not from neutral chance.
The duels in Barry Lyndon help distinguish these variations. At some points, what matters is who knows the procedure; at others, what a participant decides to do within it. The rule establishes a framework, but does not automatically determine every action. Reducing the outcome to luck would make the deliberate gestures that alter a power relationship disappear.
Choosing not to take advantage of an opportunity, for example, is not in the same category as an involuntary failure. It can change the risk and the interpretation of the encounter. Analysis should follow the specific action before assigning it a general meaning of fate. A decision can have consequences that the person making it does not fully control, without ceasing to be a decision.
The question of freedom and responsibility arises in the space between intention and outcome. Not every consequence faithfully expresses what someone wanted, and not every lack of control eliminates their causal role. The character acts within inherited conditions, but their responses can change who is exposed, what opportunity opens up and what obligation is accepted.
Risk is not distributed equally
Money changes one’s ability to withstand a contingency. A loss can be a setback for one person and a definitive interruption for another. The relationship between money and debt lets us see what room remains after a failure. Chance may affect everyone in principle, but its consequences are experienced from different material positions.
Social class introduces another difference. Barry can temporarily gain access to certain spaces without having the belonging that would protect him when his circumstances change. A failed action does not fall on an empty biography: it encounters relationships, reputations and resources that are already distributed. That is why interpreting his journey solely as bad luck would obscure the social mechanisms the film makes visible.
Institutions also classify outcomes after they occur. They may call something an error that they had previously accepted as a risk, or assign individual responsibility to protect a collective decision. The reading of institutional power makes it possible to compare this process with personal plans. The name given to failure may favour whoever controls the narrative, even if it does not fully explain how the failure happened.
Narrative form influences our perception of chance. Knowing an outcome in advance can make every detail seem to lead inevitably to it. Seeing an action without knowing its consequences keeps more possibilities open. A sense of fatality may be an effect of the narrative, not proof that nobody within the film’s world could have acted differently.
Comparing these situations means asking different questions: what was unforeseeable, what could have been anticipated and what was chosen despite a known risk. The Killing and Barry Lyndon do not offer a single theory of luck. They make perceptible the distance between a plan and its execution, and between a rule and the people who use it. That distance preserves both contingency and responsibility, without requiring one to erase the other.
References: Stanley Kubrick, The Killing (1956) and Barry Lyndon (1975). A comparative reading of planning, accident and duelling; references to the ending are limited to the mechanism being analysed and do not presuppose that the director held a doctrine of fatalism.
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