Why Kubrick’s Napoleon Was Never Made

Napoleon did not disappear from Kubrick’s plans because of a single decision made in the late 1960s. Industrial backing changed, and the director continued exploring ways to make the project viable.

There were several proposals, not just one door that closed

The question of why Kubrick did not make Napoleon requires separating two processes: the loss of backing for a specific production and the abandonment of all interest in the story. They did not necessarily happen at the same time. The existence of a screenplay and extensive research did not guarantee the money to film them, while a studio’s withdrawal did not require destroying what had already been prepared or prevent the search for another approach.

The project went through discussions and expectations involving different financiers. Eva-Maria Magel’s documentary reconstruction distinguishes the MGM-related stage from later dealings with United Artists, and dates the latter’s withdrawal to November 1969. This sequence is more useful than a general explanation about Hollywood’s fear of historical films: it lets us connect specific decisions with specific moments.

It also prevents Waterloo’s 1970 release from becoming the exclusive cause of all the earlier difficulties. A film’s subsequent box-office reception cannot, on its own, explain a withdrawal that had already happened in 1969. It may be part of the context that affected new proposals, but that influence must be demonstrated for each negotiation. Changing the order of events produces a simpler story and, at the same time, a less reliable one.

The pre-production of Napoleon shows what needed to be financed: travel, performers, interiors, costumes and large gatherings of people. The issue was not simply the imagined total cost. A film might seem affordable under one version of the schedule and cease to be so if agreements, locations or participants’ availability changed. Viability depended on a set of conditions that all had to align.

The scale of the production meant negotiating its form

A political and military biography presents a particular economic challenge. It spans places and periods that cannot all be handled with the same resources. The cost of preparing an interior with a few characters and that of organizing troop movements are not distributed evenly. This difference makes the order of work a financial decision as well as an artistic one.

Kubrick was still looking for alternatives in 1971. His October 20 memo proposed organizing the production in blocks of varying scale and considering the necessary contractual arrangements. The document demonstrates that work continued after 1969. It does not demonstrate that complete financing had become available or that those phases were carried out. Its importance lies in showing a practical response to the problem, not the start of a concealed shoot.

Dividing a film into stages could reduce certain immediate commitments, but it did not eliminate the dependencies between them. Work completed in one phase might require actors, props or landscapes from another. Stopping and resuming also introduced uncertainty. Reading the plan as an automatic solution would be as misleading as presenting it as an undeveloped idea: it was an organizational proposal still subject to decisions by others.

The industrial explanation also does not require imagining a simple clash between an artist who knew everything and executives incapable of understanding it. A financier assessed expenditures and returns; the director needed specific production conditions. The fact that these positions did not reach an agreement does not, by itself, reveal incompetence or bad faith on either side. Specific letters, budgets and decisions allow us to describe the disagreement more precisely than a legend about personalities.

The research outlasted the opportunities to film

The archive preserves evidence of later interest. Correspondence with historian David Chandler, catalogued as SK/14/6/28, begins in June 1976 with references to Barry Lyndon and continues with the possibility of collaborating on Napoleon. This exchange is incompatible with an image of the project as completely forgotten since 1969. However, continuing to correspond with a historian is not the same as reviving a financed production.

The timeline of completed work shows another distinction. Kubrick directed other films while retaining materials and an interest in subjects that had not been filmed. A pending work can continue as research, an adaptation possibility or a professional discussion. These states should not be confused with an announced filming date. The study of preparation and revision in Kubrick helps place each case according to its stage of development, without grouping them all under the label of lost films.

Nor is there a Napoleon film that can be recovered by assembling the surviving documents. A screenplay, a location photograph and a uniform design are preparatory materials. They can be published or exhibited, but they do not contain the performances, sound and timing decisions of a completed audiovisual work. The term unmade film describes this absence; lost film would imply a prior existence that has not been demonstrated here.

The comparison with the abandonment of Aryan Papers requires preserving the differences. Both projects accumulated work and were never filmed, but they belonged to different periods and involved different literary sources and production problems. An explanation that is valid for one does not become a general rule for all of Kubrick’s projects. Even the word abandonment may sum up temporary decisions that those involved described as postponements.

The preserved materials from unrealized projects make it possible to study verifiable actions: seeking financing, revising a proposal, maintaining correspondence and preparing resources. That sequence answers the original question better than attributing everything to a competing film. Napoleon never gathered the conditions needed to be filmed under Kubrick; the surviving work shows how hard he tried to adjust those conditions and how much remained unresolved.

References: Eva-Maria Magel, The Best Movie (N)ever Made: Stanley Kubrick’s Failed Napoleon Project, exhibition catalogue for Stanley Kubrick; includes the October 20, 1971 memo. University of the Arts London, Stanley Kubrick Archive, correspondence with David Chandler, SK/14/6/28. La Cinémathèque française, Stanley Kubrick exhibition, Napoléon section.

View all articles in Kubrick’s Napoleon: Development of the Unmade Project