Why Kubrick’s Napoleon Was Never Made

Napoleon did not disappear from Kubrick’s plans because of a single decision made in the late 1960s. Industrial support changed, and the director continued exploring ways to make the project viable.

There were several proposals, not just one door that closed

The question of why Kubrick did not make Napoleon requires us to distinguish between two processes: the loss of backing for a particular production and the abandonment of all interest in the story. They did not necessarily happen at the same time. The existence of a screenplay and extensive research did not guarantee the money to film them, while a studio’s withdrawal did not mean that everything already prepared had to be discarded or that another approach could not be sought.

The project went through discussions and expectations linked to different financiers. Eva-Maria Magel’s documentary reconstruction distinguishes the period associated with MGM from the subsequent negotiations with United Artists, and places the latter’s withdrawal in November 1969. This sequence is more useful than a generalisation about Hollywood’s fear of historical films: it allows specific decisions to be linked to specific moments.

It also prevents Waterloo’s release in 1970 from being turned into the sole cause of all the earlier difficulties. A later commercial reception cannot, on its own, explain a withdrawal that had already taken place in 1969. It may form part of the context affecting new proposals, but that influence must be demonstrated for each negotiation. Changing the order of events produces a simpler story, but a less reliable one.

The pre-production of Napoleon shows what needed to be financed: travel, performers, interiors, costumes and large gatherings of people. The problem was not simply the imagined total cost. A film might seem affordable under one version of the schedule, then cease to be so if agreements, locations or the availability of its participants changed. Viability depended on a set of conditions that all had to come together.

The scale of the production meant its form had to be negotiated

A political and military biography presents a particular economic challenge. It spans places and periods that cannot all be handled with the same resources. The cost of preparing an interior with a few characters is not distributed in the same way as the cost of organising troop movements. This difference makes the order of work a financial as well as an artistic decision.

Kubrick was still looking for alternatives in 1971. His memorandum of 20 October proposed organising the production in blocks of different sizes and considering the necessary contractual terms. The document demonstrates that work continued after 1969. It does not show that complete financing had become available or that these stages were ever carried out. Its significance lies in showing a practical response to the problem, not the start of some hidden filming.

Dividing a film into stages could reduce certain immediate commitments, but it did not eliminate their interdependence. Work carried out in one phase might require actors, props or landscapes from another. Stopping and restarting also brought uncertainty. To read the plan as an automatic solution would be as misleading as presenting it as an undeveloped notion: it was an organisational proposal still subject to decisions by others.

Nor does the industrial explanation require us to imagine a simple confrontation between an artist who knew everything and executives incapable of understanding it. A financier assessed expenditure and returns; the director needed particular conditions in which to make the film. The fact that these positions did not reach an agreement does not in itself reveal incompetence or bad faith on either side. Letters, budgets and specific decisions allow the disagreement to be described more precisely than a legend about personalities.

The research outlasted the opportunities to film

The archive preserves evidence of later interest. Correspondence with the historian David Chandler, catalogued as SK/14/6/28, begins in June 1976 with references to Barry Lyndon and continues with the possibility of collaborating on Napoleon. This exchange is incompatible with the idea that the project had been completely forgotten after 1969. However, continuing to speak with a historian is not the same as reviving a funded production.

The study of preparation and revision in Kubrick’s work makes it possible to place each case according to its stage of development, without grouping them all under the label of lost films.

Nor is there a Napoleon film that can be recovered by editing the surviving documents together. A screenplay, a location photograph and a uniform design are preparatory materials. They can be published or exhibited, but they do not contain the performances, sound and timing decisions of a completed audiovisual work. The term unmade film describes this absence; lost film would imply a prior existence that has not been demonstrated here.

The comparison with the abandonment of Aryan Papers requires us to preserve the distinctions. Both projects involved extensive work and were never filmed, but they belonged to different periods and involved different literary sources and production problems. An explanation that works for one does not become a general rule for all of Kubrick’s projects. Even the word ‘abandonment’ can sum up temporary decisions that those involved described as postponements.

The surviving materials from unrealised projects make it possible to study verifiable actions: seeking finance, revising a proposal, maintaining correspondence and preparing resources. This sequence answers the original question better than attributing everything to a competing film. Napoleon never brought together the conditions needed to be filmed under Kubrick; the surviving work shows how much he tried to adjust those conditions, and how much remained unresolved.

References: Eva-Maria Magel, The Best Movie (N)ever Made: Stanley Kubrick’s Failed Napoleon Project, exhibition catalogue for Stanley Kubrick; includes the memorandum of 20 October 1971. University of the Arts London, Stanley Kubrick Archive, correspondence with David Chandler, SK/14/6/28. La Cinémathèque française, Stanley Kubrick exhibition, Napoléon section.

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