Why Kubrick’s Napoleon Was Never Made

Napoleon did not disappear from Kubrick’s plans because of a single decision made in the late 1960s. Industrial support shifted, and the director continued to explore ways to make the project viable.

There were several proposals, not just one door that closed

The question of why Kubrick did not make Napoleon requires us to separate two processes: the loss of support for a particular production and the abandonment of all interest in the story. They did not necessarily happen at the same time. The existence of a screenplay and extensive research did not guarantee the money to film them, while a studio’s withdrawal did not require destroying what had already been prepared or prevent a search for another approach.

The project went through discussions and expectations linked to different financiers. Eva-Maria Magel’s documentary reconstruction distinguishes the stage associated with MGM from the later dealings with United Artists, and dates the latter’s withdrawal to November 1969. This sequence is more useful than a general claim about Hollywood’s fear of historical films: it allows specific decisions to be connected with specific moments.

It also prevents Waterloo’s release in 1970 from being treated as the sole cause of all the earlier difficulties. A later commercial reception cannot, by itself, explain a withdrawal that had already taken place in 1969. It may form part of the context affecting new proposals, but that influence needs to be demonstrated for each negotiation. Reordering events produces a simpler story, but also a less reliable one.

The pre-production of Napoleon shows what needed to be funded: travel, performers, interiors, costumes and large gatherings of people. The problem was not simply the imagined total cost. A film might seem affordable under one version of the schedule and cease to be so if agreements, locations or participants’ availability changed. Viability depended on a set of conditions that all had to align.

The scale of the production meant its form had to be negotiated

A political and military biography presents a particular economic challenge. It spans places and periods that cannot all be handled with the same resources. The cost of preparing an interior with a small cast and that of organising troop movements are not spread evenly. This difference makes the order of work a financial decision as well as an artistic one.

Kubrick was still looking for alternatives in 1971. His memorandum of 20 October proposed organising the production in blocks of different sizes and considering the necessary contractual arrangements. The document demonstrates that work continued after 1969. It does not show that full financing had been secured or that these stages were carried out. Its significance lies in showing a practical response to the problem, not a hidden start to filming.

Dividing a film into stages could reduce some immediate commitments, but it did not remove the dependencies between them. Work completed in one stage might require actors, props or landscapes from another. Stopping and restarting also introduced uncertainty. Reading the plan as an automatic solution would be as misleading as presenting it as an undeveloped idea: it was an organisational proposal still subject to decisions by others.

Nor does the industrial explanation require us to imagine a simple confrontation between an artist who knew everything and executives incapable of understanding him. A financier assessed outlays and returns; the director needed particular conditions for making the film. The fact that these positions did not reach agreement does not, in itself, reveal incompetence or bad faith on either side. Letters, budgets and specific decisions allow the disagreement to be described more precisely than a legend about personalities.

The research outlasted the opportunities to film

The archive preserves signs of continued interest. Correspondence with historian David Chandler, catalogued as SK/14/6/28, begins in June 1976 with references to Barry Lyndon and continues with the possibility of collaborating on Napoleon. This exchange is incompatible with the idea that the project had been completely forgotten since 1969. However, continuing to talk with a historian is not the same as reviving a funded production.

The timeline of completed works shows another distinction. Kubrick directed other films while retaining materials and an interest in subjects that had not been filmed. A pending work can continue as research, a possibility for adaptation or a professional discussion. These states should not be confused with an announced filming date. The study of preparation and revision in Kubrick helps place each case according to its stage of development, without grouping them all under the label of lost films.

Nor is there a Napoleon film that can be reconstructed by editing the surviving documents. A screenplay, a location photograph and a uniform design are preparatory materials. They can be published or exhibited, but they do not contain the performances, sound and timing decisions of a completed audiovisual work. The term unmade film describes this absence; lost film would imply a prior existence that has not been demonstrated here.

The comparison with the abandonment of Aryan Papers requires us to preserve the differences. Both projects accumulated work and were never filmed, but they belonged to different periods and involved different literary sources and production problems. An explanation that applies to one does not become a general rule for all of Kubrick’s projects. Even the word abandonment can sum up temporary decisions that participants described as postponements.

The materials preserved from unrealised projects allow us to study verifiable actions: seeking funding, revising a proposal, maintaining correspondence and preparing resources. This sequence answers the original question better than attributing everything to a competing film. Napoleon never gathered the necessary conditions to be filmed under Kubrick; the surviving work shows how much he tried to adjust those conditions and how much remained unresolved.

References: Eva-Maria Magel, The Best Movie (N)ever Made: Stanley Kubrick’s Failed Napoleon Project, exhibition catalogue for Stanley Kubrick; includes the memorandum of 20 October 1971. University of the Arts London, Stanley Kubrick Archive, correspondence with David Chandler, SK/14/6/28. La Cinémathèque française, Stanley Kubrick exhibition, Napoleon section.

View all articles in Kubrick’s Napoleon: development of an unrealised project